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DOORS TO SAFETY: EXITWEST, REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM
Betsy L . Fisher*
EXIT WEST. By Mohsin Hamid. New York: Riverhead Books. 2017. P. 231.
Cloth, $26; paper, $16.
INTRODUCTION
Mohsin Hamid’s1 novel Exit West traces the journey of Nadia and Saeed,
two refugees fleeing danger who discover magical doors that instantly tele-
port them across borders and to new lives in safety (pp. 103–04). Though
Hamid’s doors are fictional, Nadia and Saeed find themselves in a humani-
tarian crisis that closely mirrors reality. In 2016, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there were 22.5 million
refugees and 65.6 million forcibly displaced people worldwide.2 Just as the
international community’s efforts to assist refugees have left millions with-
out access to safety and human rights,3 so too did Nadia and Saeed struggle
to find housing, food, and medical treatment on their journey to long-term
safety. They sought safety but often did not find it as they fled west. They
faced riot police and nativist mobs who “advocat[ed] wholesale slaughter . . .
so much like the fury of the militants in her own city.”4
This Review assesses states’ use of the “doors” of refugee resettlement as
a tool to limit asylum claims in their territory and argues that, while refugee
resettlement is a critical portion of refugee protection, it must not be used to
replace asylum. Part I discusses the doors of Exit West. Part II reviews the
right of individuals fleeing persecution to seek asylum and the three durable
solutions for refugees—voluntary repatriation, local integration, and refugee
resettlement—which are inaccessible for all but a few refugees. In Part III,
this Review argues that the United States, Australia, and the European Union
have used refugee resettlement to limit, or to justify limits on, irregular mi-
gration and onshore asylum claims.
* Policy Director, International Refugee Assistance Project. This Review is published
in her personal capacity. Thanks to Christy Martenson for her encouragement and to the edi-
tors of theMichigan Law Review for their able assistance and thoughtful edits.
1. Author.
2. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2016, at 2 (2017),
http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWP5-6K2X].
3 . See infra Part II.
4. P. 159; see also p. 127.
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I. EXITWEST’STELEPORTINGDOORS
This Part outlines Hamid’s novel Exit West, which begins with Nadia
and Saeed, two young adults in an unnamed country on the brink of war.
The novel’s triumph comes in sparse prose full of humanizing details; we
meet Nadia and Saeed not as refugees but as individuals with families, stud-
ies, and occupations (pp. 3–21). Their experience in war, Hamid tells us,
could happen to any of us.
Exit West, nominated for the Man Booker Prize,5 imagines that a simple
doorway could connect countries and teleport humans instantly across the
globe. These doors “could take you elsewhere, often to places far away, well
removed from this death trap of a country. . . . A normal door, they said,
could become a special door, and it could happen without warning, to any
door at all” (p. 72).
Predictably, doors that allow for immediate transportation from place to
place are quickly “discussed by world leaders as a major global crisis” and are
tracked and observed closely by government surveillance.6 Not all doors are
as closely guarded: “[D]oors out, which is to say the doors to richer destina-
tions, were heavily guarded, but the doors in, the doors from poorer places,
were mostly left unsecured, perhaps in the hope that people would go back
to where they came from—although almost no one ever did . . . .” (p. 106).
One device proves useless for travel: “[V]isas, which had long been near-
impossible, were now truly impossible for non-wealthy people to secure, and
journeys on passenger planes and ships were therefore out of the ques-
tion . . . .” (pp. 52–53). States that could offer safety have closed legal path-
ways to people fleeing from danger, and doors do not spare Nadia and Saeed
from refugee camps, hunger, dishonest people smugglers (pp. 106, 113–16),
militarized migration controls,7 or the arbitrariness of international aid sys-
tems.8
The doors allow Nadia and Saeed to travel from their home country to a
Greek island to London and to the Bay Area, all in less than a year. The two,
who started as a young couple and then as partners in their flight to safety,
became more distant from each other as they traveled (p. 133). Nadia sought
integration and connection with refugees of other nationalities, while Saeed
sought solace from their conationals. Both identified as Muslim, but Saeed
5. Ruby Mellen, ‘Dishonesty Comes Through Omission’: An Interview with Mohsin Ha-
mid, FOREIGN POL’Y, (Oct. 17, 2017, 2:34 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/17/
dishonesty-comes-through-omission-an-interview-with-mohsin-hamid-trump-refugees-
migration/ [https://perma.cc/9VXF-VNSM].
6. P. 88; see also p. 92.
7. Armed soldiers guarded a building in Greece rumored to house a door. P. 112. And
soon after Nadia and Saeed’s arrival in London, armed guards attempted to evict a group of
migrants, who “were terrified,” since “most had seen firsthand what the police and soldiers
could do.” P. 127.
8. Nadia develops a personal connection with a worker at a clinic, who facilitates Nadia
and Saeed’s onward travel to London through a second door. Pp. 117–18.
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grew more observant. “[T]he farther they moved from the city of their
birth . . . the more he sought to strengthen his connection to it,” and he be-
came more devout, while Nadia “did not pray, and she avoided speaking
their language, and she avoided their people” (p. 187). For Saeed, prayer
provided its own means of teleportation, a way to connect with his family
and his country (pp. 202–03).
By the end of the novel, Nadia and Saeed have arrived in a place where it
seems that they are safe and where they can stay, and they part ways. Though
the doors could facilitate their return home, Nadia does not return until dec-
ades later, when she meets Saeed for coffee (pp. 229–31).
In an interview, Hamid stated that he believes the doors described in his
novel are “emotionally true to our current technological reality. You can
open your computer and look at somebody via Skype. . . . Or I can step on an
airplane, as I did the other day, and within a few hours be in New York.”9
Hamid offers hope that empathy can open doors across borders because
“[w]e are all migrants through time” (p. 209).
II. REFUGEES’ DOORS TO SAFETY
This Part discusses the challenges that refugees face in accessing a
door—that is, in escaping their country and accessing a “durable solution.”
Exit West’s fantastical doors allow refugees who have access to a door to
travel at will to safer or more desirable locations. Reality is this: the vast ma-
jority of refugees today live in perpetual limbo—without permanent resi-
dence or economic rights and with nowhere else to go.10 States have prevent-
ed asylum-seekers from accessing the state’s territory and, as part of the
strategy to limit asylum-seekers or justify limitations on asylum-seekers,
opened offshore resettlement programs that accept small numbers of vetted
refugees.11 The doors saved Nadia and Saeed from a perilous journey across
the Mediterranean Sea. But once refugees have fled from their countries, like
Nadia and Saeed, they may face xenophobic violence, be left in legal limbo,
and live in absolute poverty without adequate food or shelter (pp. 122–23,
127, 159).
A. The Right to Seek Asylum
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that “[e]veryone
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecu-
tion.”12 In turn, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
9. Mohsin Hamid’s Novel ‘Exit West’ Raises Immigration Issues, NPR (Mar. 6, 2017,
5:12 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/03/06/518743041/mohsin-hamids-novel-exit-west-
raises-immigration-issues (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
10 . See infra Section II.B.
11 . See infra Section III.
12. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14 (Dec. 10,
1948).
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(“1951 Refugee Convention”) prohibits states from penalizing “refugees
who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threat-
ened . . . enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provid-
ed they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good
cause for their illegal entry or presence.”13 International law, including the
1951 Refugee Convention, prohibits “refoulement,” or the forcible return of
individuals to persecution.14 Thus, an individual fleeing from persecution
has the right to seek asylum, if necessary through illegal entry, and protec-
tion from being forcibly returned until the person is determined not to be at
risk or until the risk ends.15
But it is increasingly difficult to become a refugee—that is, to leave one’s
country of origin and to access the territory of another state where one can
claim asylum.16 As was true for Nadia and Saeed, visas are generally “impos-
sible for non-wealthy people to secure” when fleeing danger (pp. 52–53).
And as was true for the governments in Exit West, any means of irregular
border crossing becomes “a major global crisis” (p. 88). Whereas citizens of
Germany can travel without a visa to 165 countries, citizens of conflict-torn,
refugee-producing Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan can
access 43 or fewer countries without a visa.17 Tens of thousands of Syrian
refugees, for example, remain stranded in the border area between Syria and
Jordan, out of reach of humanitarian aid, unwilling to return the dangers of
Syria, and prohibited from entering Jordan.18 This is by design: “The use of
visa controls, often enforced by carrier sanctions . . . [means that] jurisdic-
tion over the persons intended to be deterred may never be established.”19 In
other words, states seek to limit individuals fleeing from persecution from
accessing their territory, in an attempt to avoid legal obligations to those in-
dividuals, including the duty of nonrefoulement.20
13. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 31(1), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention].
14 . Id . art. 33; James C. Hathaway, Refugees and Asylum, in FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW, 177, 181–82 (Brian Opeskin et al. eds., 2012) (noting that
the 1951 Refugee Convention and other complementary international and regional treaties
prohibit forcible return of refugees and others in fear of danger).
15. Hathaway, supra note 14, at 193.
16. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 13, art. 1(a)(2) (defining a refugee as a person
who “is outside the country of his nationality”).
17 . Global Passport Power Rank 2018, PASSPORT INDEX, https://www.passportindex.org/
byRank.php [https://perma.cc/EPA8-CRSM] (data as of Oct. 31, 2018).
18. Aaron Magid, Amman’s Refugee Waiting Game: The Time Bomb on Jordan’s Border,
FOREIGN AFF. (May 24, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/jordan/2017-05-24/
ammans-refugee-waiting-game [https://perma.cc/3KAU-VE8S].
19. Hathaway, supra note 14, at 196.
20 . Id . at 192–93, 196.
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B. Durable Solutions
For those who are able to flee from their own country, access to territory
may not be enough. Nadia and Saeed were able to escape from their home-
land through a door, but only after extensive travel were they able to access
long-term legal status and a durable solution. Refugees’ humanitarian needs
are addressed when they can access one of three “durable solutions”: volun-
tary repatriation, or returning to the refugee’s country of origin; local inte-
gration, or gaining permanent residence and economic and social rights in
the refugee’s country of asylum; and resettlement, or legal admission into a
country that offers social and economic rights.21 A solution is “durable” only
if it provides a refugee with physical safety, enjoyment of basic human rights,
and long-term legal status in the country.22 For the overwhelming number of
today’s 22 million refugees, each of these durable solutions is out of reach.23
First, voluntary repatriations: fewer than 127,000 refugees repatriated to
their country of origin in 2015, and even those repatriations were described
by UNHCR as occurring “in less than ideal circumstances and against a
complex backdrop of ongoing protection challenges.”24 Nadia and Saeed
knew that they could not return, because “no one returning through a door
who was known to have fled [the militants’] rule was allowed to live”
(p. 114). But Nadia and Saeed saw some refugees, who were unable to con-
tinue their journeys or who were living in absolute poverty, return nonethe-
less to danger by taking doors known as “mousetraps” (p. 115). Instead of
voluntary repatriation, refugees have returned to their countries of origin de-
spite ongoing instability, and some are forced to return because they faced
exploitation, debt, and lack of legal protection in their countries of asylum.25
Second, local integration: most refugees live in developing countries
close to their countries of origin and where they are not afforded legal path-
ways to long-term residence or naturalization.26 Nadia and Saeed found
21. UNHCR, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern,
U.N. Doc. EC/53/SC/INF.3 (Sept. 16, 2003), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ae9ac93d.html
(on file with theMichigan Law Review).
22. UNHCR, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 32–38 (2011), http://www.
unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BKC-XQ8B] (discussing the necessary require-
ments for each durable solution, which requires in each instance personal security and access
to rights).
23. UNHCR, supra note 2, at 2.
24. UNHCR, UNHCR’S STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS 2017–2021, at 7 (2017), http://www.
unhcr.org/5894558d4.pdf [https://perma.cc/AEK6-SRVJ].
25 . See, e .g ., Kevin Sieff, ‘What Other Choice Do I Have?’: How Debt-Ridden Refugees
Are Being Forced to Return to a War Zone, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/12/15/how-refugees-are-being-forced-back-
to-a-war-zone-to-repay-their-debts/ [https://perma.cc/K3HN-LPSX] (describing Somali refu-
gees in Kenya returning to Somalia because of debt in refugee camps and being caught in con-
flict upon their return to Somalia).
26. Karen Jacobsen, The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing
Countries 1 (U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper
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themselves reliant on their own savings in their country of first asylum and
understanding of fellow refugees’ desperation and hunger. Instead of bene-
fitting from local integration in countries where they have social and eco-
nomic rights, refugees have overwhelmingly remained in developing coun-
tries where access to employment and residence is often curtailed.27
Recent international-advocacy efforts to improve access to work permits
for refugees in Turkey, the country hosting the largest number of refugees,
have benefitted few refugees’ integration in the legal labor market.28 In 2016,
Turkey announced that it would allow Syrian refugees to obtain work per-
mits; it remains unlawful for refugees to work without work permits.29 Ex-
tensive requirements and costs, including quotas limiting the number of ref-
ugees employed in a firm, have kept work permits and access to the legal
labor market out of reach for the overwhelming number of refugees in Tur-
key.30 A year and a half after the new system was announced, only 14,000
work permits had been issued to Turkey’s 3.5 million refugees.31 To be sure,
Turkey has extended other government services to refugees, including access
to health care and public education.32 But most refugees in Turkey do not
have access to local integration—or the other durable solutions.33
In Jordan, international-advocacy efforts resulted in the Jordan Com-
pact, in which Jordan agreed to provide 200,000 work permits to Syrian ref-
ugees over several years in exchange for significant international infrastruc-
No. 45, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/research/working/3b7d24059/forgotten-solution-
local-integration-refugees-developing-countries-karen.html (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) (noting that refugees living in countries of first asylum generally do not have access to
work, legal status, or education).
27 . See UNHCR, supra note 2, at 2, 27–29.
28 . See Lauren Frayer, For Syrian Refugees in Turkey, a Long Road to Regular Employ-
ment, NPR: PARALLELS (Aug. 14, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/
2017/08/14/543471407/for-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-a-long-road-to-regular-employment (on
file with the Michigan Law Review) (“Turkish government statistics show out of the 3 million
Syrians here, fewer than 14,000 had work permits by January—a year into the program.”).
29. IZZA LEGHTAS & ANN HOLLINGSWORTH, REFUGEES INT’L, “I AM ONLY LOOKING
FOR MY RIGHTS”: LEGAL EMPLOYMENT STILL INACCESSIBLE FOR REFUGEES IN TURKEY 2, 5
(2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/5a256cd30d92971
cbf01879a/1512402132711/Turkey+Report+Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9LG-YMDS].
30 . Id . at 5; Lisa DiCarlo, The False Assimilation of Syrian Refugees in Turkey, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (Apr. 11, 2017, 9:32 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/
articles/2017-04-11/the-false-assimilation-of-syrian-refugees-in-turkey (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review) (noting that, because Turkish employers’ incentive for hiring Syrian refugees
is the ability to pay them below minimum wage, employers are reluctant to legally hire refu-
gees, leaving refugees in Turkey vulnerable to labor exploitation).
31. LEGHTAS&HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 29, at 2, 5; Frayer, supra note 28.
32. Frayer, supra note 28 (noting that refugees in Turkey receive free health care and
enrollment in public schools).
33. UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT UPDATE: TURKEY (2017), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/
documents/download/59598 [https://perma.cc/D4PD-QB72].
April 2019] Doors to Safety 1125
tural and financial assistance.34 But, as in Turkey, many employers preferred
to pay refugees lower wages than to pay them above the table, and some ref-
ugees found that they could make a better living working freelance than
when tied to a single employer.35 By December 2017, the government had
issued 70,000 work permits, including expired work permits and renewals of
existing work permits, which fell short of the Compact’s target.36 In Jordan,
too, most refugees live without access to local integration or another durable
solution.37
Third, refugee resettlement offers a critical opportunity for refugees to
obtain legal status in a safe and stable country, but resettlement is available
to only a small cohort of refugees each year. In 2016, UNHCR facilitated re-
settlement of 125,800 refugees to 37 resettlement countries; this number is
dwarfed by more than 1.2 million refugees who were expected to need reset-
tlement in 2018.38 States are not required to offer refugee-resettlement pro-
grams,39 though the UNHCR encourages states to do so as a means to pro-
vide refugees with a durable solution.40 To return to Turkey as an example,
“[r]esettlement is the most accessible durable solution for the majority of
refugees in Turkey . . . . [but l]ess than 1% of the refugee population in Tur-
key are submitted for resettlement every year.”41
Resettlement programs, which are laudable means of providing refugees
with a durable solution, have been used by sponsoring states to limit and to
34. VICTORIA KELBERER, BOS. CONSORTIUM FOR ARAB REGION STUDIES, THE WORK
PERMIT INITIATIVE FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND
PRACTICE 11–12 (2017), https://www.bu.edu/ioc/files/2017/02/Work-Permit-Initiative-for-
Syrian-Refugees-in-Jordan-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T29C-7G2W]; Daniel Howden et al., The
Compact Experiment: Push for Refugee Jobs Confronts Reality of Jordan and Lebanon, NEWS
DEEPLY: REFUGEES DEEPLY (Dec. 2017), http://issues.newsdeeply.com/the-compact-
experiment [https://perma.cc/JJ3C-47K2].
35. Howden et al., supra note 34.
36 . Id .
37 . See, e .g ., JORDAN INGO FORUM, SYRIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN, A PROTECTION
OVERVIEW 19 (2018), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/JIF-
ProtectionBrief-2017-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG2D-2PVM] ( “[A]ccess to documentation/
regularization of status of refugees, unsafe school environment, the restriction on sectors al-
lowed to refugees, but also forced relocation and detention continue to be barriers to a safe,
dignified and protection life for Syrian refugees in Jordan.”).
38. UNHCR, UNHCR PROJECTED GLOBAL RESETTLEMENT NEEDS 2018, at 9–10 (2017),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/resettlement/593a88f27/unhcr-projected-global-
resettlement-needs-2018.html [https://perma.cc/9AKU-YCEH].
39. UNHCR, supra note 22, at 36 (“Resettlement is not a right, and there is no obliga-
tion on States to accept refugees through resettlement.”).
40 . Id . at 115 (“The role of [UNHCR] is to . . . advocate for additional resettlement plac-
es . . . [and] diversify and expand resettlement opportunities and programmes . . . .”); see also
Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons 4(d), 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (1951) (“The Conference . . . recommends that Gov-
ernments . . . act in concert in a true spirit of international co-operation in order that these ref-
ugees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement.”).
41. UNHCR, supra note 33, at 1.
1126 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1119
justify limits on asylum claims—often by citing irregular border crossings or
people smuggling.42 As with government responses in Exit West, states react
to restore their ability to control access to their territory. Irregular border
crossings, like doors, prevent states from screening individuals outside their
territory before entry. However, the next Part argues that resettlement pro-
grams are also often intended to ensure that refugees are vetted outside a
state’s territory, thereby limiting an individual’s right to claim asylum and
obtain protection from forcible return.
III. RESETTLEMENT AS ATOOL TO LIMITASYLUMCLAIMS
Having discussed refugees’ limited access to asylum and durable solu-
tions, this Review now addresses states’ efforts to limit, or to justify limits on,
asylum claims through refugee resettlement programs. Section III.A discuss-
es the ways in which states have used refugee resettlement to avoid their legal
obligations to refugees. Section III.B then discusses three case examples: Sec-
tion III.B.1 examines the United States, which began its policy of deterring
domestic asylum-seekers several decades ago by interdicting Haitian asylum-
seekers even as it established an offshore resettlement program. Section
III.B.2 considers Australia, which diverts maritime asylum-seeker arrivals to
the islands of Manus and Nauru, where Australia disclaims international ob-
ligations to these individuals, even as Australia maintains a refugee-
resettlement program, its preferred method of providing international pro-
tection. Finally, Section III.B.3 discusses the European Union, which has
worked at great expense to end crossings from Libya and Turkey into Greece
and Italy, while opening pathways for offshore refugee screening.
A. Resettlement as a Means to Limit “Onshore” Asylum Claims
States have prevented asylum-seekers from arriving in their territory and
lodging claims for international protection.43 Asylum claims in a state’s terri-
42. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEEADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015,
at iii–iv (2014), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/232029.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S57Q-QUEE] (stating that the U.S. government would establish a new resettlement program
“to reduce unlawful and dangerous migration to the United States”); Chloe Farand, Emmanuel
Macron Says France Will Set up Refugee ‘Hotspots’ in Libya, INDEPENDENT (July 30, 2017, 1:50
PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-france-
hotspots-libya-migrants-a7867466.html [https://perma.cc/XB7S-L8DT] (quoting French Pres-
ident Emmanuel Macron promoting a proposed resettlement program because “people avoid
taking crazy risks when they are not eligible for asylum.”).
43. Hathaway, supra note 14, at 193 (describing “the adoption by many States of ‘non-
entrée’ policies, pursuant to which an effort is made to divert refugees away from their jurisdic-
tion by indirect means (such as visa requirements), or by taking action outside their jurisdic-
tion (including on the high seas) to force refugees back to their home State. The latter tactic . . .
is proscribed by the Refugee Convention’s attribution of art. 33 duties on the basis of jurisdic-
tion (rather than arrival in a State’s territory) if the result is direct or indirect refoulement”
(footnotes omitted)); see, e .g ., Proclamation No. 4865, 3 C.F.R. 50 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182, at 168 (2012) (requiring interdiction of Haitian maritime asylum-seekers); Reagan Or-
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tory are referred to here as “onshore” refugee processing—as contrasted with
“offshore” refugee resettlement, or legal pathways for refugee admissions af-
ter screening outside the state’s territory. As in Exit West (pp. 92, 116), gov-
ernments establish armed guards and close surveillance to prevent individu-
als, including those fleeing from persecution, from entering the state’s
territory through irregular means.
An individual who receives protection through either domestic asylum
or refugee resettlement would access comparable protection: long-term resi-
dency, social and economic rights, and a path to naturalization.44 Refugees
filing a domestic asylum claim can request international protection if they
are able to enter the country’s territory,45 whereas “offshore” refugee pro-
cessing allows a state to limit quotas and to set parameters for admission.46
Only 125,000 refugees out of more than 22 million refugees were resettled in
2016.47 Individuals who request asylum from within a state’s territory may
be deported if their claim is unsuccessful, but they will often have other due
process protections, including the opportunity to appeal.48
ders Aliens Stopped on the High Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1981, at A1,
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/09/30/us/reagan-orders-aliens-stopped-on-the-high-sea.html
(on file with theMichigan Law Review); Elizabeth Collett, The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refu-
gee Deal, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal [https://perma.cc/C3SS-F2KB] (explaining the Europe-
an Union’s agreement with Turkey, in which Turkey would prevent refugees’ onward travel
from Turkey to Europe); Matt Siegel, Australia Adopts Tough Measures to Curb Asylum Seek-
ers, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/world/asia/australia-
adopts-tough-measures-to-curb-asylum-seekers.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review)
(describing Australia’s policy of routing maritime arrivals to the islands of Manus and Nauru).
44 . See, e .g ., Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Refugees and Asylees in the United States,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 7, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-
asylees-united-states [https://perma.cc/22R4-Q6S3] (“As lawful permanent residents, refugees
and asylees have the right to own property, attend public schools, join certain branches of the
U.S. armed forces, and travel internationally without an entry visa, and may apply for U.S. citi-
zenship five years after being admitted as a refugee.”).
45. Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, an asylum-seeker has the right to claim asylum
in the country in which she is physically present. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE
FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 31–33 (2d ed. 2014) (“[F]ailure to claim protection in
one’s region of origin or in the first safe country of arrival is not grounds for refusing to recog-
nize refugee status.”).
46. UNHCR, supra note 22, at 361 (“Resettlement depends on the willingness of the re-
settlement country to accept a refugee for legal stay in its territory, in accordance with its laws
and regulations.”).
47. UNHCR, supra note 38, at 9–10; UNHCR, supra note 2, at 13.
48 . See, e .g ., Almost Half of Rejected Asylum Seekers in Germany Winning on Appeal,
DW (Jan. 15, 2018), http://p.dw.com/p/2qsav [https://perma.cc/UM8D-Z2Q8] (noting asy-
lum-seekers’ success in Germany on appeal after receiving negative asylum decisions); Neil
Cuthbert & Jiyoung Song, Removal of Failed Asylum Seekers in Australia: A Comparative Per-
spective (Migration & Border Pol’y Project, Lowy Inst., Working Paper No. 2, 2017),
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/documents/Removal%20of%20failed%20asylu
m%20seekers%20in%20Australia.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5CQ-JXPU] (describing Australian,
British, and Canadian asylum procedures, including the right to claim asylum and removal
processes for rejected asylum claims).
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Given that most refugees do not have access to any durable solution, it
should be unsurprising that many refugees have undertaken dangerous
journeys to places like the United States, Australia, or Western Europe in an
attempt to access asylum in a country that offers long-term residency and
social and economic rights.49 In the examples cited below, states have sought
to limit desperate individuals from arriving spontaneously in their countries:
instead, in states’ view, “good” refugees will seek to enter through a legal re-
settlement channel.50 Having erected physical and legal barriers to entry in
violation of international law, states open resettlement programs with the
promise to open the smallest of doors to prescreened refugees.
To be clear: refugee resettlement is an essential element of any refugee-
protection scheme, and refugee resettlement should be supported and drasti-
cally expanded to provide vulnerable refugees with a legal pathway to safety
in a resettlement state51—where growing bodies of evidence find economic
benefits from resettlement programs.52 But refugee resettlement should not
come at the cost of the right to seek asylum, a bedrock principle at the heart
of the international human rights regime.53 These case studies present three
efforts, two state and one regional, to limit onshore asylum while using refu-
gee resettlement as a deterrent and justification for limiting access to asylum.
49 . See, e .g ., Tharanga Yakupitiyage, Thousands Still Dying at Sea En Route to Europe,
INTER PRESS SERV. (Jan. 15, 2018), http://www.ipsnews.net/2018/01/thousands-still-dying-sea-
en-route-europe/ [https://perma.cc/69DN-NPT2] (noting that, in just one week in early 2018,
160 people were feared to have drowned in the Mediterranean).
50 . See, e .g ., Maria O’Sullivan, Questioning the Australian Refugee Model, NEWSDEEPLY:
REFUGEES DEEPLY (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/
01/09/questioning-the-australian-refugee-model (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (not-
ing that the Australian government views the proper way of seeking refugee protection as ap-
plying through the offshore resettlement program).
51. UNHCR, supra note 22, at 36 (noting the role of resettlement in promoting individ-
ual refugees’ access to safety and fundamental rights, providing a durable solution, and provid-
ing a mechanism for resettlement states to express solidarity with refugee-hosting countries).
52 . See, e .g ., CHMURA ECON. & ANALYTICS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REFUGEES IN THE
CLEVELAND AREA (2013), https://www.hias.org/sites/default/files/clevelandrefugeeeconomic-
impact.pdf [https://perma.cc/438Y-SATD]; Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Somini Sengupta, Trump
Administration Rejects Study Showing Positive Impact of Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/us/politics/refugees-revenue-cost-report-trump.html
(on file with the Michigan Law Review) (describing a draft report from the Department of
Health and Human Services finding that the “net fiscal impact of refugees was positive over the
10-year period [from 2005 to 2014], at $63 billion”); William N. Evans & Daniel Fitzgerald,
The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the United States: Evidence from the ACS 6–7
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23498, 2017), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w23498 (on file with theMichigan Law Review) (finding that resettled refugees contrib-
ute, on average, $21,000 in taxes more than benefits received in the twenty years after admis-
sion to the United States).
53 . See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, art. 14(1); UNHCR, su-
pra note 22, at 38 (“By offering an appropriate solution to refugees with individual protection
or specific needs, UNHCR seeks to reinforce asylum in host countries by relieving the strain on
them, thereby promoting durable solutions benefiting the entire refugee population con-
cerned.”).
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B. Case Studies
1. United States
The United States has long worked to prevent asylum-seekers from
landing on its territory and has used refugee resettlement to discourage ir-
regular migration. In the 1980s, waves of asylum-seekers fleeing Haiti at-
tempted the dangerous sea journey to the United States.54 U.S. President
Ronald Reagan issued a series of executive decisions ordering the U.S. Coast
Guard to interdict these vessels and prevent their onward journey to the
United States.55 In 1993, the Supreme Court held that international obliga-
tions, including those derived from the 1951 Refugee Convention, did not
apply extraterritorially to Haitian asylum-seekers interdicted by U.S. Coast
Guard vessels.56 In 2010, in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in
Haiti, then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton affirmed that interdiction
would continue to be U.S. policy: “Our ordinary and regular immigration
laws will apply going forward, which means that we are not going to be ac-
cepting into the United States Haitians who are attempting to make it to our
shores. They will be interdicted. They will be repatriated.”57 Individuals seek-
ing international protection were, and are, denied access to U.S. territory.
Yet just one year before President Reagan ordered interdiction of asy-
lum-seekers attempting to arrive by sea, Congress enacted the 1980 Refugee
Act,58 which established a system for refugee resettlement to the United
States.59 This system facilitated the resettlement of several hundred thousand
refugees during the Reagan presidency.60
More recently, resettlement was used explicitly to decrease irregular
border crossings to the United States. In 2014, the United States opened a
refugee-resettlement program for Central American minors, children who
were still in their country of origin but who had a parent with legal status in
54 . See Reagan Orders Aliens Stopped on the High Sea, supra note 43.
55. Proclamation No. 4865, 3 C.F.R. 50–51 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182, at 168
(2012); Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 180–82 (1981).
56. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
57. Michael A. Clemens, Opinion, To Help Haiti’s Earthquake Victims, Change U .S .
Immigration Laws, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/01/22/AR2010012202274.html [https://perma.cc/X5M8-TZ78].
58. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
59 . See 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2012) (setting a system for annual admission of refugees).
60 . See U .S . Annual Refugee Resettlement Ceilings and Number of Refugees Admitted,
1980-Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-
hub/charts/us-annual-refugee-resettlement-ceilings-and-number-refugees-admitted-united
[https://perma.cc/3GHN-XAVW] (presenting annual refugee admissions by fiscal year, includ-
ing the years of President Reagan’s presidency).
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the United States.61 The program was explicitly intended to reduce irregular
border crossings: “One element in our comprehensive strategy to reduce un-
lawful and dangerous migration to the United States is the planned estab-
lishment of in-country refugee programs for minors in Honduras, El Salva-
dor, and Guatemala.”62 By resettling refugees through offshore, screened
programs, President Obama’s administration hoped to decrease border
crossings and onshore asylum claims.
U.S. government policy under President Donald Trump has shifted to
limit both forms of refugee protection—asylum and refugee resettlement.
The Central American Minors (CAM) refugee program was canceled in
2017.63 The U.S. government was scheduled to resettle up to 110,000 refu-
gees in its 2017 fiscal year;64 but then-recently elected President Trump
capped refugee admissions for that year at 50,000,65 limited resettlement for
fiscal year 2018 to 45,000, and is likely to resettle far fewer.66 The United
States has aggressively prosecuted asylum-seekers seeking to enter the coun-
try without authorization67—policy that clearly violates the 1951 Refugee
Convention.68
2. Australia
Since 2013, Australia has prevented asylum-seekers who arrive by boat
and without valid visas from applying for asylum.69 Instead, asylum-seekers
61 . In-Country Refugee/Parole Processing for Minors in Honduras, El Salvador and Gua-
temala (Central American Minors – CAM), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. [hereinafter
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., CAM], https://www.uscis.gov/CAM [https://perma.cc/
RTS5-GWB7] (last updated Nov. 15, 2017).
62. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET AL., supra note 42, at iii–iv.
63. U.S. CITIZENSHIP& IMMIGR. SERVS., CAM, supra note 61.
64. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2017, at ii (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/262168.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CH79-3XKL].
65. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 3 C.F.R. 272 (2017).
66. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2018, at 6 (2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/274857.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XRT2-TB3T]; Conor Finnegan, Trump Admits Less than Quarter of Proposed Refu-
gees at Six-Month Mark, ABCNEWS (Mar. 30, 2018, 4:25 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
trump-admits-quarter-proposed-refugees-month-mark/story?id=54123008 [https://perma.cc/
8BRX-3V5F].
67. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PUNISHING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS: THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 3–4 (2018), https://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/2018-Report-Punishing-Refugees-Migrants.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GGH6-DGDF] (“CBP officers refer, and DOJ often prosecutes, asylum seek-
ers for illegal entry into or presence in the United States regardless of their intention to seek
protection, and no federal district along the border has a policy of exempting asylum seekers
from criminal prosecution.”).
68. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 13, art. 31(1).
69. Lisa Jane Archbold, Offshore Processing of Asylum Seekers – Is Australia Complying
with Its International Legal Obligations?, QUT L. REV., no. 1, 2015, at 137; Siegel, supra note 43.
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have been warehoused on the Pacific islands of Manus and Nauru, where
they have languished in shockingly inhumane conditions.70 In effect, Aus-
tralia has sought to avoid obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention
toward asylum-seekers by denying refugees access to its territory.71 When
New Zealand offered to resettle 150 refugees living on Manus and Nauru,
Australia declined the offer, citing concern that this might encourage future
asylum-seekers to attempt the journey to Australia.72
Even as Australia has denied thousands of refugees the chance to claim
asylum in its territory, it has maintained a UNHCR-sponsored resettlement
program.73 “Successive Australian governments have justified the offshore
system by emphasizing that resettlement is the ‘proper’ mode for claiming
asylum as it ensures protection is given to those refugees who are most in
need.”74 This deterrence policy comes at a steep humanitarian—and fiscal—
cost. Housing refugees in Manus and Nauru cost Australia nearly $3.9 bil-
lion, in addition to millions paid out in legal fees to those detained, a cost
that Australia appears to deem justifiable in the interest of deterring future
onshore asylum claims.75
3. European Union
In the wake of mass arrivals of asylum-seekers walking across Europe in
2015, the European Union began to take significant steps to fortify its bor-
70. Behrouz Boochani, ‘This is Hell Out Here’: How Behrouz Boochani’s Diaries Expose
Australia’s Refugee Shame, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2017, 12:30 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/this-is-hell-behrouz-boochani-diaries-expose-australia-
refugee-shame (on file with the Michigan Law Review); ANDREW & RENATA KALDOR CTR. FOR
INT’L REFUGEE LAW, FACTSHEET: WHO IS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR OFFSHORE PROCESSING
ON MANUS AND NAURU? (2018), http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/
Factsheet_Legal%20responsibility%20offshore_11.08.08.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TQB-9YTG].
71. However, states are responsible for their action no matter where it occurs. Because
Australia has funded and overseen the detention of asylum-seekers on Manus and Nauru, ad-
vocates and scholars have submitted that Australia is liable for human rights abuses occurring
there. See Hathaway, supra note 14, at 196; AMNESTY INT’L, ISLAND OF DESPAIR: AUSTRALIA’S
“PROCESSING” OF REFUGEES ON NAURU 44–46 (2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
documents/asa12/4934/2016/en/ [https://perma.cc/8PMR-VCHY].
72. Eleanor Ainge Roy, Jacinda Ardern Denies Report that Asylum Offer Led to Surge in
People Smuggling, GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2018, 11:40 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2018/jan/23/jacinda-ardern-denies-report-that-asylum-offer-led-to-surge-in-people-
smuggling [https://perma.cc/K5KK-CVXG]; Paul Karp & Eleanor Ainge Roy, New Zealand
Seeks Deal with Australia to Resettle Manus and Nauru Refugees, GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2017,
9:48 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/nov/17/new-zealand-and-png-
could-do-deal-on-refugees-peter-dutton-says [https://perma.cc/VL8D-AKUR].
73 . Resettlement, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettlement.html [https://
perma.cc/T3P6-MNRT] (stating that only a small number of states, including Australia, take
part in UNCHR’s resettlement program).
74. O’Sullivan, supra note 50.
75 . Id .
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ders to prevent refugees and migrants from claiming asylum inside the EU.76
The EU reached an agreement with Turkey in 2016 to resettle refugees from
Turkey to the EU, but the goal of this resettlement program was not to ex-
pand refugee protection.77 EU states would return new asylum-seeker arri-
vals from the EU to Turkey, and the EU would resettle refugees directly from
Turkey, all with the intent of discouraging irregular migration.78 “For [Euro-
pean Union] leaders the objective was clear: to find a way to prevent un-
checked arrivals into the European Union.”79
As a result of this agreement, tens of thousands of refugees remained
trapped in Turkey, in limbo on Greek islands, and trapped in south and cen-
tral Europe, prevented from moving onward.80 “[S]ome Syrian asylum-
seekers have been forcibly returned to Turkey without having access to asy-
lum and without being able to appeal against their return, in breach of inter-
national law. Others have ‘voluntarily’ returned to Turkey because of the
misery on the Greek islands.”81 Much like Nadia and Saeed’s experience on
the island of Mykonos, desperation leads some refugees to return to places
where their legal status and safety is uncertain (p. 115). Turkey’s efforts to
prevent onward migration from Turkey to Europe have been successful, but
as of February 2017, only 3,565 Syrians had been resettled to the EU through
the agreement.82
The EU has also expended significant resources to prevent refugees and
migrants from reaching Europe by sea routes across the Mediterranean from
North Africa.83 EU efforts to prevent maritime arrivals in Europe led to a
rapid increase in the number of migrants in Libyan government detention or
being held by smugglers in appalling conditions—observers reported seeing
“thousands of emaciated and traumatised men, women and children piled
on top of each other, locked up in hangars with no access to the most basic




77 . See id . (stating that “EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey agreed on the
EU-Turkey Statement to end the flow of irregular migration from Turkey to the EU and re-
place it with organised, safe and legal channels to Europe”).
78 . Id . at 2.
79. Collett, supra note 43.
80. Nick Squires, A Year On from EU-Turkey Deal, Refugees and Migrants in Limbo
Commit Suicide and Suffer from Trauma, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 14, 2017, 2:57 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/14/year-eu-turkey-deal-refugees-migrants-limbo-
commit-suicide-suffer/ [https://perma.cc/DA25-PPN8].
81. Kondylia Gogou, The EU-Turkey Deal: Europe’s Year of Shame, AMNESTY INT’L
(Mar. 20, 2017, 10:20 AM) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-
deal-europes-year-of-shame/ [https://perma.cc/FMK3-MQF6].
82. Id .
83 . See Nima Elbagir et al., People for Sale: Where Lives Are Auctioned for $400, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/14/africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html
[https://perma.cc/HQD8-JBXL].
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necessities, and stripped of their human dignity.”84 Migrants report being
beaten, tortured, housed in horrific conditions, and sold in a slave market.85
EU states are now proposing “hotspots” that would allow them to screen
individuals in North Africa for refugee resettlement.86 France has announced
its intentions to establish “hotspots,” or refugee processing centers, in Libya,
Niger, and Chad, because, in the words of French President Emmanuel Mac-
ron, “people avoid taking crazy risks when they are not eligible for asylum.”87
The program aims both to deter irregular migration and to inform those
seeking asylum “that those with legitimate claims of persecution do have a
chance for safe passage.”88 Critics of this proposal note that offshore refugee
screening replaces obligations under international law with voluntary hu-
manitarian gestures. It undermines the institution of asylum and confirms
state sovereignty and control over migratory flows. This is to say nothing of
the erosion of any agency for the refugees themselves, let alone the likely
conditions of hotspots, considering the human rights situation in many of
the countries expected to host them.89
At the same time, the French government has introduced a new Asylum
and Migration Bill that would, if passed, increase the time that onshore asy-
lum-seekers can be detained and criminalize irregular entry into France.90
The CAM program in the United States and the EU hotspots in North Africa
both aim to reduce irregular border crossings and also provide significant
benefits to the individuals resettled through them.91 It is beneficial to allow
people seeking asylum to reach safety without undergoing dangerous jour-
neys. These programs should not, however, be allowed to justify limits on
asylum.
84. Agence France-Press, EU’s Policy of Helping Libya Intercept Migrants Is ‘Inhuman,’
Says UN, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2017/nov/14/eu-libya-coastguard-detention-centres-migration-mediterranean-un-zeid-raad-
al-hussein [https://perma.cc/7KDX-HSQ6].
85 . Migrant Slavery in Libya: Nigerians Tell of Being Used as Slaves, BBC: NEWS (Jan. 2,
2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42492687 [https://perma.cc/WY2L-X9HR];
Elbagir et al., supra note 83.
86. Shani Bar-Tuvia & Marie Walter-Franke, Why Some E .U . States Want Hotspots in
the Sahel, NEWS DEEPLY: REFUGEES DEEPLY (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/
refugees/community/2017/11/10/why-some-e-u-states-want-hotspots-in-the-sahel
[https://perma.cc/V4DY-QM9N].
87. Farand, supra note 42.
88. Adam Nossiter, At French Outpost in African Migrant Hub, Asylum for a Select Few,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/world/africa/france-africa-
migrants-asylum-niger.html (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
89. Bar-Tuvia &Walter-Franke, supra note 86.
90. Hélène Soupios-David, Op-ed: The French Asylum Bill – A Deeply Unbalanced Pro-
posal, EUR. COUNCIL ON REFUGEES & EXILES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.ecre.org/op-ed-the-
french-asylum-bill-a-deeply-unbalanced-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/GT2T-NGTF].
91 . See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., CAM, supra note 61; Bar-Tuvia & Walter-
Franke, supra note 86.
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All told, the EU has paid billions of euros to curb migration across the
Central Mediterranean and from Turkey into Greece.92 EU states’ offers to
expand resettlement for refugees are, like resettlement policies in the past in
the United States and currently in Australia, primarily intended to discour-
age asylum claims rather than to promote refugees’ access to durable solu-
tions.
CONCLUSION
Mohsin Hamid’s novel Exit West reminds us of refugees’ urgent need for
doors to safety and the failures of modern asylum systems that prioritize
border security over human rights. Hamid’s doors allowed refugees from
war-torn countries to access safer places without government scrutiny; refu-
gees seeking asylum in places like the United States, Australia, and the Euro-
pean Union, however, find ever-greater obstacles to their own pathways to
asylum. Government resettlement programs provide a pathway for only a
small number of refugees to access a durable solution even as states build ob-
stacles to domestic asylum claims. States thus fail to uphold their obligation
under international law to protect the right to asylum. The Universal Decla-
ration on Human Rights notes that every person has the right to claim asy-
lum from persecution.93 The 1951 Refugee Convention requires signatory
states to abstain from criminalizing asylum-seekers in its territory,94 and in-
ternational law prohibits states from forcibly returning individuals to a place
where they would face danger or persecution.95
Refugee resettlement is a crucial tool to provide refugees with access to
safety, and states should drastically expand resettlement programs. But refu-
gee resettlement cannot replace domestic asylum systems. Western states,
which host only a tiny portion of the global population of refugees,96 forsake
their human-rights obligations to the global community and the humanitari-
an needs of individual refugees when they bar access to asylum on their terri-
tory. States must not to be allowed to violate the international right to asy-
lum by resettling refugees. Opening the smallest of doors cannot justify
building walls.
92. Jennifer Rankin, EU ‘Running Out of Money’ to Stop Migrants Travelling from Afri-
ca, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017, 6:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/20/eu-
running-out-of-money-stop-migrants-travelling-africa [https://perma.cc/3EAS-TM5P]; Alissa
J. Rubin & Jason Horowitz, European Leaders Look to Africa to Stem Migration, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/world/europe/africa-migrants-
europe.html (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
93. This right to asylum, guaranteed in Art. 14(1), is conditioned by Art. 14(2), which
denies this protection to individuals who are convicted of “non-political crimes” or “acts con-
trary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 12, art. 14(2).
94. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 13, art. 31(1).
95 . Id . at 33(1).
96 . See UNHCR, supra note 2, at 2 (“Developing regions hosted 84 per cent of the
world’s refugees under UNHCR’s mandate . . . .”).
